These two examples of innovation are described and explained in Mark D. In the mids, Andy Marshall wrote three memoranda on the concept of military revolutions. Houghton Middleton, , pp. The TSO report did not reference, critique, or correct the theme of trusted agents developed in the earlier studies. As a result, obtaining positive identification PID was more problematic, and U. Of course, the widespread use of ambiguous concepts has a central role in debates over roles, resources, and organization in Washington and elsewhere because fuzzy assertions can be used to support or rationalize almost any proposed action or action taken.
This training aided in-theater efforts to reduce civilian casualties and mitigate their impact. But progress in growth of knowledge is faster when supported by systematic criticism. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Two issues will be introduced here: That is why we can say that, in science, we often learn from our mistakes, and why we can speak clearly and sensibly about making progress there. These lessons were drawn from four years of analytic effort focused on understanding and effectively responding to the challenge of CIVCAS in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. At least four advantages will accrue to JCOA from supplementing its work on lessons learned and best practices with research to build knowledge about problem-solving and decision-making.
The Journal of the Japanese Clinical Orthopaedic Association
Include specific causal factors for civilian casualties in training. Counterinsurgency in Iraq In Iraq, noncombatant casualties were primarily caused by escalation of force EOF incidents, both at check points and during convoy operations. In contrast, the United States and its allies went to great lengths to minimize collateral damage; for example, in Iraq, similar to Afghanistan, most air engagements used precision-guided munitions.
The I2O report observed that ad hoc structures and processes were created to fit IO functions into division HQ staffs and to coordinate IO and kinetic operations.
Yet, the acceptance and application of this strategic form of assessment is remarkable; it represents and approach to rational self-correction that few public or private organizations employ; it might form jcox basis of a narrative to the U. Absent such knowledge, solutions to problems must depend on less efficient and less effective approaches: Yet, Ordnance Department leaders did not ask themselves whether data from operations would be relevant to improving vehicle performance and the design and production casr.
They have to oversee and manage staff structures and processes to propose lines of acse and calculate and compare impacts, interactions, and tradeoffs of many policies and programs.
He acknowledges how difficult institutionalizing new patterns of thought, analysis, and conduct can be,15 and why the capacity to conduct operational analysis is indispensable to his larger goal of achieving institutional adaptation.
Navy ship engaged a small boat in the Persian Gulf and incidents regarding U.
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Drone Strikes Civilian Casualty Considerations
In addition to not knowing what actions, processes, and organization are associated with mission successes, it is not clear what actions do not work or why an event was a surprise. On 7 OctoberU. In both attacks, U. Finally, the culture will influence practice by enabling people to communicate and share knowledge.
JCOA analyst could reduce conceptual ambiguity by building on observations and findings of previous reports. Remember me on this computer. Mandeles, Military Transformation Past and Present: Houghton Middleton,pp.
Ruminations on the Reflections of John M. Open-source reporting is suggestive that USG efforts in operations outside declared theaters of armed conflict share these challenges. Within days of the start of operations, international media began reporting incidents of civilian casualties. In Kcoa, noncombatant casualties were primarily caused by escalation of force EOF incidents, both at check points and during convoy operations. The final justification for developing and conducting research sttudy a set of themes or concepts is that the themes provide an agenda around which JCOA leaders and analysts can engage intellectually with combatant commanders cse their staffs.
In addition, Fedayeen Saddam forces did not wear uniforms and fought using irregular tactics, contributing to U. As a result, obtaining positive identification PID was more problematic, and U.
A state description models the structures and processes under examination or sets criteria to identify them; it is a description of the world as sensed. Two questions preface the comparison. While processes and operating jcooa in Afghanistan can differ from those in operations outside declared theaters of armed conflict, the factors above suggest that a stduy analysis of civilian casualties in such operations would be worthwhile.
Patton described what they saw and the feedback process he initiated.
The memorandum also examined the adequacy of pre-invasion processes and functions, such as training and developing doctrine. Likewise, the logic of how to conduct operational analysis and assessment stuy messy real- world military problems is straightforward; a key requirement is developing systematic, accessible, reliable, and valid data at the appropriate level of detail.
While many adaptations were evident in-theater, much of this adaptation to reduce civilian casualties by forces was not specifically supported or addressed in their pre-deployment training. The International Security Assistance Force ISAFin conjunction with individual casee nations, began implementing many of the recommendations contained in that paper. University of North Carolina Press, Lessons learned reports focus on tactical issues.